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In 1989 the Australia government introduced an
income contingent loan for the payment of higher
education tuition charges, known as the Higher
Education Contribution Scheme (HECS).The debt is
repaid through the income tax system and at the time
it was the first of its kind. Since then similar arrange-
ments have been adopted in, among other countries,
New Zealand (1992), South Africa (1991), the UK
(2006),Thailand (2006) and Israel (planned for 2008).
As well, there is currently active consideration of
potential higher education financing reforms towards
income contingent loans in Germany, Malaysia,
Canada and a host of other countries.It is not an exag-
geration to suggest that there is an on-going quiet rev-
olution internationally in higher education financing
towards the adoption of income contingent loans.
This paper examines the basis of income contingent
loans for higher education financing, focusing on the
Australian experience with HECS.1 A key aspect of
the discussion is an analysis of the benefits in concept,
and a difficulty in practice, of income contingent
loans. A major issue for the adoption of HECS was
the potential for the scheme to reduce the access of
the disadvantaged to Australian higher education; an
extensive review of the literature illustrates that this
has not eventuated.As well, there is evidence to sug-
gest that HECS has been associated with significant
increases in the size of the higher education system
and has proved to be administratively inexpensive.
This is not to suggest that income contingent loans are
a panacea to international higher education funding
difficulties however,since there are important institu-
tional challenges to the adoption of such approaches.
Brief history of the introduction of HECS2
1973 to 1986
Australian universities required students to pay fees
until 1973. Even then, the vast majority of students
had fee obligations exempt through the receipt of
scholarships awarded on the basis of academic merit.
Fees were abolished in 1973 for all students,meaning
that from the early 1970s to the late 1980s Australian
Universities were financed without any direct contri-
bution from students.
This policy stance changed significantly in 1986 with
the institution of the Higher Education Admini-
stration Charge (HEAC), a small up-front fee on all
university students of $(A)250 in 1987 terms, a
charge which did not vary with respect to either dis-
cipline or course load. In symbolic terms the institu-
tion of HEAC was significant in that it represented
government endorsement of the charging of fees,
and thus set the scene for more radical reforms
involving user-pays.
The revenue raised from HEAC was trivial in com-
parison to the total costs of higher education –
amounting to around three percent only of teaching
costs. In 1987 it remained the case that taxpayers
provided practically all of the finances for higher
education.At this time a conjunction of forces made
it inevitable that the government would move
financing arrangements towards increased contribu-
tions from students.These forces were as follows.
First, over the 1980s there was a significant increase
in year 12 (the final year of high school) completion
rates, but there was not a commensurate expansion
in higher education places.This resulted in the polit-
ical problem of large and growing queues of quali-
fied prospective students.
Second, while this problem could have been solved
with increased Commonwealth budget outlays, the
Labor Government was intent on fiscal parsimony
and not prepared to spend the additional taxpayer
resources necessary to finance additional university
places (Edwards 2001).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly with respect
to the political process,at least two cabinet ministers,
John Dawkins and Peter Walsh, were strongly in
favour of student fees on grounds of redistribution.
Their view was that a system which did not charge
higher education students was regressive: after all,
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Chapman and Ryan (2002).universities were paid for by all taxpayers, yet stu-
dents came from relatively privileged backgrounds,
and as graduates they received relatively high per-
sonal economic benefits. It is important to record
that Peter Walsh and John Dawkins were then
respectively in charge of the critical Ministries of
Finance and Higher Education.
The introduction of HECS
In 1987 John Dawkins invited the author of this
article to prepare a report outlining the costs and
benefits of different approaches to the introduction
of a user-pays higher education system for Aus-
tralia. The report presented analyses of several
financing mechanisms, including up-front fees with
scholarships, up-front fees with government sub-
sidised bank loans, and an income contingent
charge system.The paper recommended the last of
these, with repayments being made via the direct
tax system. Details were provided of how such a
system might work, including possible fee levels
and repayment parameters.
The minister believed that this report would have a
difficult reception, for three reasons. First, the
Australian Labor Party (ALP) in government had
abolished university fees in 1973, and this had hap-
pened under the larger-than-life Labor icon, former
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam.Second,at that time
the Labor Party platform included a statement to the
effect that “ … all education should be free of
charge”. Third, the income contingent payment sys-
tem recommended was both radical and untested:
there was no similar scheme internationally,and thus
no empirical or political basis to assess its likely eco-
nomic, social and administrative implications.
Minister Dawkins’ response was to set up a commit-
tee chaired by a popular former state labor premier,
Neville Wran, to examine the relative merits of
potential options. It was clear from the Terms of
Reference that the government’s intent was to set
the scene for the introduction of charges.
In May 1988 the Wran committee recommended
that all Australian undergraduates should be
required to pay a uniform charge, with the timing
and level of payment being dependent on income.
This became policy in 1989, with the income contin-
gent feature of HECS being unique internationally.
At that time the first repayment threshold was
around $(A)50,000 per annum in 2007 terms.
Labor lost power in 1996, but the new Conservative
government maintained the essence of HECS.
However, in 1997, charge levels were increased by
about 40 percent on average, differential charges by
course were introduced and the first income threshold
at which graduates began to repay their loans was
decreased to around $21,000 per annum.This last deci-
sion was reversed in 2005, at which time the govern-
ment also allowed some price discretion and extended
HECS to cover full-fee paying domestic students.
The advantages of, and a difficulty with, income
contingent loans3
The failure of capital markets for the financing
of higher education 
Some might be tempted to ask why government
intervention is required with respect to higher edu-
cation financing. Why not impose charges at the
point of entry and allow prospective students with-
out access to the financial resources needed to pay
the tuition borrow the finances from banks? 
The problem is that commercial banks will not in
general be interested in providing loans to finance
human capital investments. The concern of a bank
lending in these circumstances is that, unlike many
other purchases from a prospective debtor, there is
no saleable collateral in the event of default — such
as would be the case for the housing capital market
— and there is no slavery market in which to sell the
human capital being developed. As well, and as
recognised in Barr (2001) and Chapman (2006),
investment returns from higher education are highly
variable and uncertain. This implies a real risk to a
bank with respect to default in the situation of for-
mer students receiving low future incomes.
The governments of many countries (for example,
the US,Canada,Japan and the Netherlands) address
these problems by acting as a guarantor for student
loans, and by paying the interest on the debt for the
period before the borrower’s graduation.A problem
inherent in this approach is that because the loans
are government guaranteed,high default rates imply
additional government subsidies, which can be very
high.4 What now follows examines other difficulties
with this approach.
CESifo DICE Report 2/2007 56
Reform Model
3 Much of the discussion in this section follows that of Chapman,
Rodrigues and Ryan (2007).
4 See Harrison (1995) for data on US student loan defaults.CESifo DICE Report 2/2007 57
Reform Model
Income contingent repayment and default protection
Instead of allowing some prospective students access
to a bank loan with a government guarantee, other
countries (including Australia, New Zealand and the
UK) have adopted income contingent loan systems,
in which the former student repays the debt through
the tax system,with repayments being dependent on
incomes. Making repayments conditional on future
income has a special advantage over other typical
debt repayment schemes, a point now explored.
One advantage of an income contingent repayment
approach is that it avoids the basic problem of the
usual type of loan offered by banks, known as a
‘mortgage style’ loan. Unlike income contingent
loans, normal bank loans require repayments to be
made over a specified period of time, for example,
the term of a mortgage.Usually no weight is given to
the consequences of a borrower’s low income: the
contract specifies that debt obligations have to be
met within a given period of time.
The essential difference between income contingent
and mortgage types of loans is that the income con-
tingent variety serves to protect prospective students
from the costs of the exigencies associated with the
financial returns to educational investments. So
income contingent loans offer a form of “default
insurance”,such that former students do not have to
bear the costs of reneging on their debt as a result of
periods of low future incomes.This is quite different
to a mortgage-style loan, in which the costs of
defaulting exist and may be very high in terms of the
defaulter being locked out of other borrowing mar-
kets (most notably for housing) through damage to
credit reputations.
Default protection with income contingent repay-
ment overcomes a fundamental problem for pro-
spective borrowers inherent in other loan schemes.
With income contingent approaches there is unlike-
ly to be any concern about prospective students
being unable to repay a loan or making repayment
under financial duress.
Income contingent repayment and consumption
smoothing
A related problem for students with bank loans con-
cerns possible consumption difficulties associated
with fixed repayments.If the expected path of future
incomes has a high variance, a fixed level of a debt
payment will increase the variance of disposable
(after debt repayment) incomes.The point can be il-
lustrated with the following simple example, with
much more detail being available in Chap-
man (2006).
Imagine that a student incurs a debt with a constant
monthly level of repayments of $500 after gradua-
tion, say, for five years. If her monthly income is
expected to be a constant amount of $5,000 after-tax,
then the debt is also a constant proportion of
income,in this case 10 percent.It is more likely to be
the case that she expects her income to increase over
time,as a result of promotions for example,implying
that the bank repayment would be expected to fall as
a proportion of disposable income.In these cases the
bank loan should not be expected to significantly
affect her welfare.
But in the event of misfortune, such as job loss, or
sickness, the former student’s income stream might
be far less stable than for the above circumstances.
For example, imagine that the student experiences a
monthly after-tax income stream of $5,000 for the
first year, but only $1,500 for the second year. In this
case, her  ex post loan obligations turn out to be
10 percent of income initially, but then reach
33.3 percent of income. The fixed loan repayment
obligation is then associated with the likelihood of
significant consumption hardships. Moreover, the
possibility has a greater potential to discourage loan
take-up from those expecting to not have access to
alternative finances to help in the event of low future
incomes,and these are more likely to be members of
relatively disadvantaged groups.
However, with income contingent loan repayments
the above difficulties are avoided. Imagine that the
repayment rule is 12 percent of income when month-
ly incomes are above $3,000, and zero otherwise. In
the above example the former student pays $600 a
month of her debt in the first year, but is not
required to pay anything in the second year.That is,
income contingent loan schemes offer insurance
against consumption hardship, and this is because
they are based on capacity to pay, not time as is the
case with a mortgage-type loan.
An important administrative concern
In Australia and other countries in which an income
contingent loan system has been introduced,this has
been a relatively simple matter from an administra-tive point of view. The reasons for this are that the
public administration systems of these countries fea-
ture a strong legal framework, a universal and trans-
parent regime of income taxation and/or social secu-
rity collection, and an efficient repayment mecha-
nism.The last involves computerised record keeping
of residents’ vital financial particulars and, very
importantly, a universal system of unique identifiers
(often accompanied by an identity card).
Under these circumstances it is not complicated to
identify and track individual citizens and their
incomes over time and space. It is not expensive,
moreover, to tack onto some existing tax collection
mechanism an additional function: the collection of
payments from ex-students, on the basis of a fixed
proportion of income.In the developing world,how-
ever, these preconditions are often lacking.
Chapman and Nicholls argue that the minimum con-
ditions for a successful income contingent loan5
seem to be:
(i) accurate record-keeping of the accruing liabili-
ties of students;
(ii) a collection mechanism with a sound, and if pos-
sible, a computerised record-keeping system; and
(iii) an efficient way of determining with accuracy,
over time,the actual incomes of former students.
Some would argue that a further basic requirement
for the introduction of an income contingent loan is
a strong legal framework and functional judicial sys-
tem. Indeed, it is hard, from a developed-world per-
spective, to imagine implementing a workable
scheme outside this context.However,it is important
to be mindful of the need to tolerate imperfections
in any scheme – within the limits imposed by the
need for policy integrity and credibility.
It is worth emphasizing that of the three conditions
noted above for the implementation of an income
contingent loan, two apply also to the collection of
any kind of loan.The exception involves determining
with accuracy,over time,the actual incomes of former
students. This seems to require an effective income
tax system including a reliable, preferably universal,
system of unique identifiers; accordingly this particu-
lar criterion is likely to be the most difficult institu-
tional barrier to reform in developing countries.
Australia’s experience with HECS: the access of the
poor to the system6
At the time of the introduction of HECS close to
nothing was known about the effects of income con-
tingent loans, because the scheme was the first of its
kind.There are several areas of interest in an assess-
ment of the empirical consequences of HECS,but by
far the most important issue concerned the effects of
introducing an income contingent tuition charge on
the participation of the poor in higher education.
This is the main focus of what now follows.
Studies of the participation of disadvantaged groups
The biggest policy and political concern with respect
to the introduction of HECS was whether or not
imposing a charge on students to be repaid in this
way would have adverse consequences for the par-
ticipation of poor prospective students. In the two
instances in which the policy was changed after 1989,
in 1997 and in 2005, the same issue has arisen.There
have been a large number of disparate investigations
into this matter.
For example,Aungles et al. (2002) used the local area
socio-economic averages concerning education and
occupation,as did Andrews (1999),to explore the pos-
sibility of there being an effect on commencements of
the relative disadvantaged from the very significant
increases in HECS changes in 1997. In general, they
found that the share of university commencements of
students from low socio-economic backgrounds did
not change. However, there was apparently an effect
of differential HECS on subject choice, with a de-
crease in enrolments of low socio-economic status
males in courses in which the HECS charge increased
most. The actual numbers involved were very small
(less than 200 individuals) and these individuals were
not discouraged from attending university per se, they
simply changed their course choice. Chapman and
Ryan (2005) report a similar effect in direction for this
group using a measure of family wealth, but it was not
found to be statistically significant.
Other studies have used individually based socio-eco-
nomic status measures in analysis of Australian higher
education participation. Long, Carpenter and Hayden
(1999) and Marks et al. (2000) used four and five pan-
els of longitudinal data, respectively, to identify how
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education participation changed in Australia from the
1980s to the late 1990s.Long et al.(1999) used parental
education and occupation to identify differences in
education participation by socio-economic status, as
well as an indirect wealth index constructed from
responses by individuals to questions about the pres-
ence of material possessions in their houses.
Chapman (1997) analysed university participation
among 18 year olds with the two of the cohorts also
examined by Long et al. (1999) and concluded that
the introduction of HECS had not affected universi-
ty participation by students from disadvantaged
backgrounds. Chapman’s approach had the advan-
tage of measuring university participation in 1988 for
the third cohort, prior to the introduction of HECS.
However, not everyone aged eighteen in these data
had completed school when surveyed in the relevant
years, so the estimates understated university partic-
ipation among young Australians.
The measure of participation used by Marks et al.
(2000) for the additional cohort they analysed dif-
fered from that used for the earlier cohorts by Long
et al. (1999). It was the proportion of individuals in
higher education in 1999 that had been in Year 9 in
1995. The wealth measure used by Marks et al.
(2000) for the last panel also differed from the earli-
er ones.This research confirmed the positive impact
of wealth on higher education participation.
However, in general, their results suggested that
socio-economic status was less important in deter-
mining higher education participation in the 1999
data than had been the case in the earlier panels.
Marks and McMillan (2006) analyse university par-
ticipation within ranges of the entrance scores used
by universities to select students for undergraduate
courses in 1999.They find that within these entrance
score ranges,individuals whose parental occupation-
al backgrounds are “blue” collar are as likely to par-
ticipate in university as those whose parental occu-
pational backgrounds was professional. They con-
clude that since occupational origins have little influ-
ence on university participation once entrance
scores are taken into account, HECS has not
deterred students from less privileged backgrounds
from attending university.
Cardak and Ryan (2006) produced similar results.
They found that students from the most disadvan-
taged social backgrounds entered university at simi-
lar rates to those from the most advantaged back-
grounds who had the same university entrance
scores as them. Their university participation rates
were much lower than those from the most advan-
taged backgrounds because they were less likely to
obtain an enter score and obtained a much lower
one on average where they did. Among students
with the same levels of school achievement in year 9,
those from more advantaged backgrounds were able
to convert that achievement into substantially high-
er university entrance scores by the end of their
schooling than otherwise similar students from poor-
er backgrounds.
Chapman and Ryan (2005) analyse the access effects
of HECS using three of the longitudinal panels of
data used in the Long et al. (1999) and Marks et al.
(2000) studies. They use a consistent definition of
university participation across these three cohorts.
Chapman and Ryan (2005) analyse the participation
in higher education of 18-year-olds in the first year
they could potentially attend university.Thus for the
first two cohorts they estimated the participation in
higher education in 1988 and 1993 of individuals who
should have reached Year 12 in 1987 and 1992,
respectively. For the 1999 cohort analysed in Marks
et al. (2000), Chapman and Ryan analysed higher
education participation among 18-year-olds.
Chapman and Ryan concluded that the introduction
of HECS did not affect the access of the disadvan-
taged, in terms of enrolments. They found that the
socioeconomic composition of the higher education
student body changed somewhat between 1988 and
1993 in Australia,with the main change being the rel-
ative increase in participation by individuals in the
middle of the wealth distribution.
In the period after significant modifications to
HECS all socio-economic groups experienced the
same proportionate increases in participation.
Further, while there was an across-the-board
decrease in the intentions of secondary students con-
cerning university participation in 1996 after the
announcement of the changes, in the next year (for
all socio-economic groups) enrolment intentions
rebounded to their previous levels. Finally, for those
who had not intended to participate in university, no
differences associated with socio-economic back-
ground were found in the proportion that eventually
did participate.
More generally,Chapman and Ryan (2005) conclud-
ed that changes in overall university participationappeared to reflect different behaviour across gen-
ders rather than across socio-economic groups, with
the exception that growth was highest among the
middle of the wealth distribution.
The conclusions from the Australian research with
respect to socio-economic mix and access are as fol-
lows:
(i) The relatively disadvantaged in Australia were
less likely to attend university even when there
were no student fees.This provides further sup-
port for the view that a no-charge public univer-
sity system (that is, financed by all taxpayers) is
regressive;
(ii) The introduction of HECS was associated with
aggregate increases in higher education enrol-
ments;
(iii) HECS did not result in decreases in the partici-
pation of prospective students from relatively
poor families, although the percentage point
increases were higher for less disadvantaged stu-
dents, especially in the middle of the wealth dis-
tribution;
(iv) There was a small decrease in the aggregate
number of applications after the 1997 changes,
but no apparent decreases in commencements
of members of low socio-economic groups,
except perhaps for a small number of males into
courses with the highest charges; and
(v) The significant changes to HECS introduced in
1997 were associated generally with increases in
the participation of individuals to 1999,irrespec-
tive of their family wealth. Even so, the growth
in participation has slowed since then.
It appears that there have been few consequences
for the accessibility to higher education for students
from relatively disadvantaged backgrounds, at least
as represented by enrolments. Broadly speaking, the
socio-economic make-up of the higher education
student body was about the same in the late 1990s
and early 2000s as it was before HECS was intro-
duced. This may not, of course, be the consequence
of the income contingent repayment characteristic of
the system,since this might have happened also with
other financing approaches.
HECS revenue, changes in the size of the system and
administration costs
Additional data with respect to the role of HECS in
the Australian higher education system are analysed
in full in Chapman (2006).In summary the following
points may be made:
(i) HECS has been associated with considerable
increases in revenue for the government, of the
order of about $(A) 13 billion in total, with
annual receipts being of the order of $(A)1.3
billion. Governments have used these resources
to reduce considerably the proportion of the
financing that is funded by taxpayers;
(ii) The  number of students in the system has
increased very considerably in the 1988–2007
period, by around 70 percent; and
(iii) In administrative terms the costs of running
HECS, for the Australian Taxation Office and
the universities, have been estimated by
Chapman to be of the order of $(A)60 million
per year, which is less than 5 percent of the
annual receipts from the scheme.
There are some caveats and qualifications to several
of these conclusions, essentially along the lines that
the findings with respect to revenue, aggregate
demand and student access cannot be traced direct-
ly to the fact that HECS is an income contingent
loan per se. Much of the 1989–2007 Australian high-
er education experience might well have resulted
from the introduction of charges financed in other
ways,such as up-front fees with scholarships.As well,
it is critical to reinforce that the institutional and
administrative arrangements need to be appropriate
to allow income contingent schemes to be imple-
mented, and in many developing countries this will
not be the case.
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